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1. CULTURE, IDENTITY AND MULTICULTURALISM
In the last ten years the concepts of culture and identity have regained popularity
in political and legal analysis. Multiculturalism has become a prominent strand of
thought in political and legal philosophy. Defenders of multiculturalism emphas-
ize the plural character of contemporary societies, and argue that it is an issue of
justice to accommodate these cultural differences by providing cultural rights for
minority groups. Will Kymlicka in particular has done groundbreaking work in
his defence of cultural rights as being consistent with social–liberal political the-
ories such as those of Rawls and Dworkin.1 Kymlicka’s strategy has been to show
that most liberal democratic governments have adopted policies to accommodate
cultural differences and to recognize and promote minority cultures, for example
through group differentiated rights. In doing this he shifted the burden of proof by
pointing out the discontinuity between practices in liberal states and liberal polit-
ical philosophy. He thus argued that since cultural rights are consistent with liberal
political theory, they should be seen as an integral part of the liberal catalogue
of rights. However, critics like Brian Barry argue that cultural rights undermine
the legal protection of civil, political, and social rights that are normally offered
by liberal states to individual members of minority groups.2 Besides the recogni-
tionof cultural rights as citizenship rightswithin a (nation) state, cultural rights can
also be interpreted and recognized as an element of the catalogue of human rights.
2. CULTURAL RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS
In her recent book, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Yvonne Donders elaborates
on cultural rights as a human rights provision, and focuses on the right to cultural
identity. Her research is guided by two questions: should a right to cultural identity
1. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989);Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority
Rights (1995).
2. B. Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (2001).
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be furtherdevelopedasa separate rightwithinthe frameworkof internationalhuman
rights law? if yes, what could be the nature, scope, and content of this right? (p. 9).
The international bill of human rights is codified in three instruments: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Five categories of human rights are distinguished:
civil, political, social, economic, and cultural. It is a generally accepted view in inter-
national human rights law that all these human rights are equally important,
and they are assumed to be an interdependent, indivisible, and interrelated part
of the international bill of human rights (p. 2; ch. 4). However, cultural rights
have received less attention than the other categories of human rights, espe-
cially civil and political rights. As a consequence, they are not well developed.
Although there are references to the right to cultural identity in various instru-
ments of international law, for example Article 27 UDHR and Article 15 ICCPR,
a separate right to cultural identity has not yet been adopted as a subjective
right. Donders gives three main categories of reasons for this immature status of
such cultural rights: conceptual, political, and pragmatic. One important reason
is the ontological vagueness of the term. Its conceptual building blocks, ‘cul-
ture’, ‘identity’, and ‘community’, are vague, and therefore are hard to translate
into legal provisions (ch. 2). Moreover, there are political reasons for the under-
developed status of cultural rights (p. 68). Governments have been very reluctant
to control the cultural life of their community (with the exception of totalitarian
regimes) and they also fear that strengthening cultural rightsmay lead to tensions in
society, endanger national unity, and even fuel demands for separation. Finally, the
emphasis on sub-elements of cultural identity in covenants (e.g. Article 15 ICESCR)
ignores the encompassing character of culture and undermines the right to cultural
identity as such as an operational concept in legal and political debates (ibid.).
The book is organized in two main parts. The first part (chs. 2–4) is an ana-
lysis of the conceptual and normative debates surrounding cultural identity as a
human right. Donders draws upon information from anthropology and sociology
for her description of culture and cultural identity; she analyzes arguments from
political–theoretical defences (mainly based on Kymlicka’s work, as described in
section 1) for her description of cultural rights; and she presents an introduction of
the human rights framework as a way of discussing the right to cultural identity
within that framework. The second part of the book (chs. 5–11) analyzes several
established human rights provisions to determine how the right to cultural iden-
tity is protected within these provisions. It focuses on several declarations and con-
ventions (the UDHR, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR), and on organizations (UNESCO,
the Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe). Finally, it dis-
cusses the right to cultural identity in relation to indigenous peoples in general and
one example thereof: the Sami in northern Scandinavia. Not only are the provisions
themselvesdiscussed,butalso theirdraftingprocessesanddominant interpretations
by academic scholars. The book is not intended to be interdisciplinary: it is primar-
ily focused on international law, whereas the other disciplines serve as auxiliary
science.
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3. THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A HUMAN RIGHT
Under which conditions can the right to cultural identity be developed as a full-
grown separate category within the framework of international human rights
law? Donders argues that at least two conditions should bemet. The first condition
is that this right must be essential for the protection of human dignity.
In this book, human dignity is considered a basic value, or . . . an ‘intrinsic worth’.
Respect for human dignity implies that individuals are not treated as instruments or
objects of the will of others. Instead, individual choices in matters of beliefs, way
of life, ideas and feelings should be respected. Human dignity is clearly violated
if certain treatment humiliates beliefs and choices of individuals. Respect for hu-
man dignity implies also respect for the communities that individuals are part of.
(p. 17)
She claims that within the international human rights debate, the value of cultural
membership for humandignity is ‘generally agreed on’ (p. 63). The second condition
is that the right to cultural identity must be justiciable. A right is justiciable if it can
be subjected ‘to the scrutiny of a court of law or another judicial or quasi-judicial
body’ (p. 18). This implies that such a right must be sufficiently clear and refer to
concrete obligations for government (pp. 18, 66–7).
A complicating factor is the presumed collective character of the right to cul-
tural identity. Defenders of collective rights argue that membership of a cultural
community is central for the human dignity of its members and that, consequently,
these communities should be protected by collective rights. They claim that the
introduction of collective human rights is necessary, because the individualistic
character of other human rights makes them unfit for the protection of cultural
communities. Critics, however, argue that this collective character of the right
to cultural identity might have unfortunate effects. It could be abused by re-
pressive regimes for supporting intolerable practices – intolerable in the sense
of justifying the violation of other human rights, especially civil and political
rights.3
Donders’s aim in this book is to investigate whether a separate right to cultural
identity (whether collective or individual) is desirable, necessary, or possible. She
conceptualizes culture as ‘a dynamic process, without fixed centres or precise bound-
aries. It is a complex system of beliefs and practices, which can change and develop,
although there is a certain core’ (p. 29).Cultural identity is conceptualized as the per-
sonificationofaculture, therelationbetweenthepersonandherculture (p.30). It can
involve various aspects of culture: arts, literature, religion, language, cultural herit-
age, andeducation, but alsohabits, traditions, customs, and institutions (pp. 30, 327).
If cultural identity is important for human dignity, we should seek to find ways to
protect it within the political and legal framework. One question is whether such
cultural rights should be a collective right, assigned to the community as such, or a
group right, which is a group-differentiated individual right (p. 49).Moreover, a right
to cultural identity can be recognized in the form of soft law, containing guidelines
3. These arguments are similar to those made by Barry against multiculturalism (supra note 2).
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of conduct, not legally binding norms of law laid down in declarations and having
moral and political value, but with a limited legal value. Hard law is expressed in
legally binding instruments such as treaties (pp. 79–80).
In her analysis of the established human rights provisions she concludes that the
right to cultural identity is used only as soft law: it is seen as a general value, that
deserves to be respected and that underlies several specific rights for members of
minority cultures.
As a general conclusion, Donders argues that the right to cultural identity should
not be recognized as a separate right within the framework of international human
rights law. First she refutes the right to cultural identity as a collective right. Follow-
ing Galenkamp and other theorists, she argues that such collective rights may lead
to a process of making absolute collective identities and policies of conservation
of identity (p. 55). This may result in the locking up of individual members in
their community, leading to the suppression of internal opposition and the possible
violation of individual rights. She concludes:
I am not convinced that the protection of cultural communities and cultural identit-
ies should take place through collective rights . . .The definition of the community
and its cultural identity poses difficulties, but more important are the arguments of
locking up individuals in a collective cultural identity, the relation between the indi-
vidual and the community and the possible conflict between individual and collective
rights. An individual approach appearsmore appropriate, because cultural communit-
ies only exist through the consent of the members of the community. In my view,
communities should not be allowed to oppress individuals by invoking collective
rights. (p. 57)
Moreover, in the final chapter, Donders concludes that the right to cultural
identity should not be developed at all, neither in the form of hard law nor as
soft law:
[T]ranslating cultural identity into a separate right is neither desirable nor neces-
sary. It is not desirable because translating the vague and general concept of cul-
tural identity into a right would risk abuse or suppression of individual rights and
freedoms within a cultural context. It is not necessary because existing cultural rights
in the broad sense already offer possibilities for the protection of cultural identity.
Hence, a separate right to cultural identity cannot satisfy the criteria for the prolif-
eration of human rights, namely, that new rights should only be developed if they
truly add something to the existing human rights, if there is sufficient consensus
among States, and if they are sufficiently clear to bring about rights and obligations.
(p. 337)
The refutation proceeds in three steps. In the first step it is concluded that the
comprehensive nature of cultural identity cannot be reduced to a concrete and
justiciable right. ‘A right, especially if it were to have a justiciable character, should
be sufficiently clear to be used before a judicial body, and the State obligations to
the right should be concrete’ (p. 337). In itself this is not enough for the refutation
of the right to cultural identity, since other human rights also sometimes relate to
vague and dynamic concepts. Therefore she adds a second step, concluding that: ‘It
is the risk of the abuse of this vague and broad right, for example the suppression
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of individual rights and freedoms, that is decisive’ (p. 338). It can be misused to
excuse questionable cultural practices within cultural communities. The third step
argues that existing human rights provisions ‘already offer possibilities in relation
to the protection of (aspects of) cultural identity’: non-discrimination, the freedom
of religion, expression, and association, and the right to education (p. 339). These
human rights provisions protect indirectly the right to cultural identity as a general
value.
4. AN EVALUATION OF TOWARDS A RIGHT TO CULTURAL
IDENTITY?
This book has several strengths: it is well written and well organized, and the
author shows great scholarship in the field of international human rights. The book
gives a comprehensive overview of many aspects of the right to cultural identity
in international law and its defence in conventions, declarations, and covenants.
It not only gives an extensive overview of human rights arrangements in which
the right to cultural identity has been discussed; the author also elaborates on
conceptual and normative issues surrounding this subject. I have one major point
of criticism. For an investigation into the desirability of the introduction of a right
to cultural identity, the book focuses too much on the legal debate on human
rights while the reason why human rights are so important, namely the protection
of human dignity, remains underexposed. I think that some issues in the con-
temporaryhuman rights debatemight benefit froma shift in emphasis fromhuman
rights to human dignity. I will elaborate this point by playing the devil’s advocate
and raising some questions about the conclusion concerning the indefensibility of
therighttocultural identity.Sincethebookiswritteninthetraditionofhumanrights
research,mydiscussion is only partly a critique, andmore an attempt to broaden the
debate. Iwill focus on two issues: the distinctionbetweennormative anddescriptive
analysis (section 5), and the right to cultural identity as a separate category of human
rights (section 6).
5. NORMATIVE VS. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Thestrengthof thebookis its combinationofconceptual,normative, anddescriptive
analysis. Unfortunately this comprehensive character is also a weakness, because
the author seems to conflate two forms of analysis that should be kept separate:
descriptive and normative.4 A descriptive analysis is offered by an external observer
of the debate. One describes the situation of the right to cultural identity in political
and legal debates, its development over time, andmaybe even presents a forecast of
possible future developments. One describes its implementations in conventions,
declarations, and so on, and explains why governments are reluctant to recognize
4. This division is endorsed by the author when she distinguishes the study of law as it is (de lege lata) and the
desirable development of the law (de lege feranda) (p. 19).
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specific human rights. A normative analysis implies participation in the debate. If
one is of the opinion, as the author is, that the right to cultural identity is an import-
ant element of respect for human dignity, one should seek to clarify the conceptual
and normative issues. One should seek ways to overcome the problems that block
the translation of the issue into rights. One starts from the value of human dignity,
and aims to make as strong a case as possible for the inclusion of a right to cultural
identity in the internationalbill ofhumanrights.This iswhatRawls calls the realist–
utopian position: presenting a normative defence that ‘extends what are ordinarily
thought of as the limits of practical political possibility’.5 This implies a critical
distance from actual political debates. One’s first worry should not be the political
feasibility of the proposal; instead, one hopes to influence the political debate by
giving additional arguments for one’s position. One can do both, as the author does,
but both analyses should bekept separate. In this book the two lines of argument are
conflated. The author starts with the normative project, defending the importance
of the right to cultural identity as an interpretation of human dignity. However, as
the argument proceeds, this normative aim becomes watered down as political and
pragmatic arguments are also taken into consideration (see for example pp. 338–9).
Her strength in her conceptual and normative analysis is that it is not only based on
academic debates in anthropology, sociology, and political theory, but also includes
information from actual debates such as the discussions of the Fribourg Group
(pp. 76–9) and the chapters on the right to cultural identity in several human rights
provisions (chs. 4–11). However, she not only includes conceptual and normative
building blocks for her argument, she also starts worrying about the political feas-
ibility of the proposal (p. 78).
She takes the opinions of national states as a fait accompli, and does not critically
scrutinize these opinions. The fact that some countries would not accept specific
human rights need not undermine a normative defence of such human rights.
The fact that China and other Asian tigers dispute (elements of) the Universal
DeclarationofHumanRights doesnot in itself undermine thevalueofhuman rights
as a critical instrument for evaluating these and other regimes. On the contrary, a
focus on human rights pre-eminently enables us to take a critical distance from
actual policies of actual governments, and criticize them from the point of view of
lack of respect for human dignity. As Donders herself asserts: ‘Human dignity is the
source of human rights. Human rights are derived from the basic value of human
dignity, not from the State or any other authority. This implies that human rights
are for everyone and that these rights cannot be taken away’ (p. 17).
Asimilarargumentcanbemadefortherighttocultural identity. Insomecases, the
fact that somegovernmentsdoopposesucharight shouldbeanadditional reasonfor
an impassioned normative defence for the inclusion of the right to cultural identity
in the human rights provisions. One should not focus primarily on the question
whether the right to cultural identity is accepted by governments; instead, one
should seek to give a strong normative defence, based on the idea of human dignity,
5. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), 6.
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of the inclusion of the right to cultural identity as an element of the human rights
catalogue.
6. THE RIGHT TO CULTURAL IDENTITY AS A SEPARATE CATEGORY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
While reading the book, I was somewhat confused about the status of the right to
cultural identity. Although her research question aims to investigate the right to
cultural identity as ‘a separate right within the framework of international human
rights’ (p. 9), throughout the book Donders interprets this right as an element of
cultural rights. More generally, I find the conceptual framework of the relationship
between human rights unclear, not only in her own analysis, but also in the human
rights discourse in general (as described by the author). On the one hand, cultural
rights are seen – together with civil, political, economic, and social rights – as an
interdependent, indivisible, and interrelated part of the international bill of human
rights, as codified in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the ICESCR (p. 2). On the other
hand Donders seeks to describe cultural rights as a separate category. As someone
unfamiliar with the field of international human rights, I was surprised by this
apparent contradiction: either the set of human rights is interdependent, indivisible,
and interrelated, or the several human rights can be described in separate categories.
This is not only academic hair-splitting: one of the reasons why Donders denies the
right to cultural identity is because it cannot be conceptualized as a separate cat-
egory. Moreover, viewing the complex of human rights as ‘interdependent, indivis-
ible, and interrelated’ implicitly assumes that human rights cannot be conflicting.
And if they do conflict, this formulation does not provide a tool to balance them. At
the same time, however, it is perfectly clear thatDonders presupposes a hierarchy of
human rights, because recognizing (collective) cultural rights should never lead
to the suppression of existing (individual) human rights (see pp. 15, 57, 334–5,
337).
As I understand from the book, the description of the relation between the dif-
ferent categories of human rights is problematical. Donders criticizes Karl Vasak’s
metaphor of generations of human rights because it incorrectly suggests that one
generation supersedes and replaces the other (p. 94). Instead, the several categories
ofhumanrights aremeant to supplementandmutually strengtheneachother.How-
ever, this character isnotdisplayed in thecategorical contradistinctions inwhichthe
debate is phrased: the emphasis on differential human rights as separate categories,
the strict division between individual and collective rights, and so on. For example,
Donders concludes that ‘From a legal point of view, a right to cultural identity falls
naturally within the category of cultural human rights’ (p. 331; my italics). At the
same time, as she asserts, it is clear that the right to cultural identity is also protected
by other human rights (e.g. civil rights such as the freedom of religion, expression,
and association) (cf. p. 74). Another example is a quote in the book, claiming that
cultural rights ‘jeopardize’ the division of human rights into freedom rights and
rights demanding state action (p. 71). A large part of chapter 4 (especially pp. 69–76)
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is devoted to this problem of the interrelations between the supposedly separate
categories of human rights.
A possible solution for this conceptual problem is to shift the emphasis from
the human rights themselves to the underlying conceptions of human dignity. Ulti-
mately the central aim of human rights is to protect human dignity. Human dignity
can be discussed at several levels of abstraction and has many different aspects. At
a high level of abstraction we refer to the concept of human dignity itself; at a lower
level of abstraction, we refer to different conceptions thereof as particular interpret-
ations of the concept in a specific context.6 There are many conceptions of human
dignity, and the most important of them have been translated into human rights.
These different conceptions of human dignity and their inferred human rights are
additive and partly overlapping, and each of them is a reaction to different social
and political realities. Civil rights emerged as the protection of citizens against the
backgroundof absolutemonarchs, claiming that humandignity presupposes amin-
imumof individual freedomandself-determination.Economicrightsemergedalong
with the rise of socialism, claiming that human dignity and self-determination pre-
suppose specific social and economic conditions to be fulfilled. The corresponding
catalogue of human rights can therefore not be an essentialist enumeration of sep-
arate categories; instead, it is a more or less organic collection of rights, deemed
important for the protection of different conceptions of human dignity. Given
that human rights have been formulated against the background of differential
social and political realities, these rights are not reciprocally exclusive, but, instead,
cumulative, partly overlapping, and potentially conflicting (cf. p. 73).
This potential conflict between several conceptions of one concept is not uncom-
mon. The concept of human dignity is formulated at such a high level of abstraction
that possible disagreements about its interpretation and implementation are con-
cealed. Only when it is made more concrete, that is, translated into conceptions
and the accompanying human rights, do these disagreements come to the fore. As
Dworkin explains: ‘At the first level agreement collects around discrete ideas that
are uncontroversially employed in all interpretations; at the second the controversy
latent in this abstraction is identified and taken up.’7
Instead of using the generations metaphor, we could describe the catalogue of
internationalhumanrights intermsofapilemetaphor.8 Thefirst layerconsistsof the
most fundamental human rights, namely civic and political rights, protecting the
accompanying conceptions of human dignity. The second layer, consisting of social
and economic rights, presupposes and leans on the first layer, but adds elements
that are insufficiently covered by thefirst layer. Since the later layers presuppose the
earlier ones, they can only be defended as long as the rights defended here do not
6. I followhereDworkin’sdistinctionbetween ‘concept’ and ‘conception’. SeeR.Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously
(1977), 134–6; idem, Law’s Empire (1986), 71; J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), 14, n. 15.
7. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 6, at 71.
8. This metaphor is inspired by the work of Mark Bovens andWillemWitteveen on the ‘edifice of the consti-
tutional state’. See, e.g., M. Bovens and E. Loos, ‘The Digital Constitutional State: Democracy and Law in the
Information Society’, (2003) 4 Information Polity: The International Journal of Government and Democracy in the
Information Age 7.
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obstruct the conceptions of humandignity as defendedby theunderlying layer. And
since the first two layers still do not cover all aspects of human dignity, we have to
add a third layer, consisting of cultural rights, possibly including a right to cultural
identity.
This metaphor has at least three advantages. For one thing, it is different from
Vasak’s generations metaphor, in the sense that later rights do not replace their
predecessors. Instead, they presuppose them; they are necessary as their foundation.
Moreover, with this metaphor the fact that some aspects of cultural identity are
already covered by civic rights, such as the freedom of religion, is not a problem
(cf. 72–4). Finally, additional human rights can only be defended in this model
for as long as they are not inconsistent with earlier rights, because they would
then undermine the accompanying conception of human dignity. For example,
cultural rights can only be defended if they are necessary to protect the accom-
panying conception of human dignity (e.g. cultural identity), and do not interfere
with the conceptions of human dignity protected by civil and political rights. This
implies an automatic protection of more basic human rights against later ones, and
makes the implicit hierarchy as found in Donders’s argument explicit.
Thismetaphor enables us to defend the right to cultural identity in a conditional
way, depending upon the situation under which this right is claimed by a cultural
community. As such it can protect specific cultural practices when they provide
members of cultural communities with a sense of belonging or personal integrity,
since these are seen as one conception of human dignity. And this is precisely what
Donders aims to do:
In short, a right to cultural identity should be universally applicable to all communit-
ies and individuals, regardless of their language, traditions, geographical place, etc.,
because cultural identity is an important element of human dignity. The specific im-
plementation of this right may, in principle, vary, depending upon the situation and
the cultural identity involved. However . . . the implementation of a right to cultural
identity cannot takeplaceunconditionally. Toprevent the implementationof a right to
cultural identity emptying existing human rights of theirmeaning, itmust not restrict
existing human rights. (p. 15)
7. CONCLUSION
Donders’s conclusion that ‘translating cultural identity into a separate right is
neither desirable nor necessary’ (p. 337) cannot be drawn from the evidence she
provides in the book. Her first argument, the ontological vagueness of cultural iden-
tity, is weaker than her presentation would have us believe. I agree that it is very
hard to conceptualize cultural identity in sociology and anthropology, because in
these fields one seeks to understand cultural identity as such (cf. ch. 2). However, in
political–theoretical and legal debates the conceptualization of cultural identity is
a less holistic task. The question of the protection of cultural identity only comes up
when it is in danger. For one thing, cultural identity comes to the surface when it is
directly confrontedwith other cultural identities (p. 35).Moreover, the awareness of
one’s cultural identity is strengthened when this identity is in jeopardy (p. 328). So,
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although it is true that cultural identity in general is hard to conceptualize, at the
moments relevant for this debate –when endangered – it seems to bemore tangible
than in other situations.
Thesecondargument is that theright tocultural identity ‘mightbeabused toexcuse
questionable cultural practiceswithin cultural communities’ (p. 338,my emphasis).
However, inothercases the right tocultural identitymightbeused to supportvaluable
cultural practices against unjustified prohibitions by illiberal governments.9 The
implicit assumption throughout the book is that cultural communities can be (and
are actually) oppressive and states can’t, for example: ‘In my view, communities
should not be allowed to oppress individuals by invoking collective rights’ (p. 57).
But isn’t this a peculiar assumption, especially in a defence of human rights?
Of course, not all cultural practices can be supported, for example female cir-
cumcision, because it conflicts with another conception of human dignity: namely
personal integrity (as protected by civil rights). But the fact that some (or maybe
even many) practices cannot be defended for this reason does not undermine
the right to cultural identity as such as an interpretation of a specific concep-
tion of human dignity. Indeed, the questions are (i) to what extent a cultural
practice is essential for human dignity; and (ii) to what extent this practice is in
conflict with another conception of human dignity. These questions cannot be
answered in general, but have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by a court
of law, such as the European Court of Human Rights. Such a decision should
be made by balancing (the importance of) the relevant conceptions of human
dignity.
The third argument claims that existing human rights provisions already offer
possibilities in relation to the protection of (aspects of) cultural identity (p. 339).
But Donders does not reassure us that all relevant cultural practices are protected
by these other human rights. The right to cultural identity might still be relevant
for cultural practices that:
(1) contribute substantively to theirmembers’ identity and senseof integrity, that
is, they are essential for their human dignity;
(2) do not violate other conceptions of human dignity (e.g. personal integrity);
and
(3) are not covered byother human rights that protect aspects of cultural identity.
I am not sure whether such practices exist. However, the argument in this book
cannot ensure that they no not exist. To identify them we have to focus on the
relation between cultural identity and conceptions of human dignity, and discuss
whether all relevant conceptions of human dignity are covered by existing human
rights.
However, these issues can only be identified in a normative analysis that fo-
cuses on the importance of (differential conceptions of) human dignity, the relation
9. For adiscussion inmulticulturalismon the limited roleof governments thathaveoppressedminority groups
see: J. Spinner-Halev, ‘Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression, and the State’, (2001) 112 Ethics 94–8.
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betweenhumandignityandhumanrights,andthepossibleconflictsbetweenseveral
conceptions of human dignity and their related human rights. That is, these debates
on international human rights law could benefit from a more thorough analysis of
normative political philosophy, especially contemporary multiculturalism.10
Roland Pierik∗
TanakaAkihiko,TheNewMiddleAges: TheWorldSystem in the 21stCentury, translated
by Jean Connell Hoff, Tokyo, International House of Japan, 2002, 264 pp. (first
published asAtarashii ‘chūsei’ 21seiki no sekai shisutemu (1996)).
DOI: 10.1017/S0922156503221385
1. WHAT’S NEW ABOUT THE NEW MIDDLE AGES?
For more than fifteen years now there has been a diffuse feeling that the world is in
a state of metamorphosis, but it is not quite clear what end-state, if any, this entails.
There is a certainhypnotic effect of such fashionable catchwords as postmodernism,
globalization, and global governance. Most of these catchwords are ahistorical in
that they create the image of a world radically different from anything we know
from the past.
To ward off this hypnotic effect, one may check the heuristic value of historical
analogies such as hegemony and –why not? – empire. From the historical armoury,
new medievalism is still another conceptual tool to grasp the present historical
transformation. Expressed in the briefest formula, newmedievalism is the idea that
the emergentworld systemhas important structural similaritieswith the European
Middle Ages.
Historical analogies are always problematic in that they may blind us to what
is novel in the present historical conjuncture. But to the extent that the diagnosis
of a new medievalism is empirically warranted, it has the decisive advantage that
at least to a certain extent it avoids the ahistorical blindness of other diagnostic
instruments.
Of course one may object that new medievalism has a Eurocentric cultural bias.
When talking about the newMiddle Ages,1 it is almost always the EuropeanMiddle
Ages to which one is referring. On the other hand, it is all themore astonishing that
from time to time there are non-European voices talking about new medievalism.
10. For some recent normative work in normative political philosophy that could be relevant, see M. Ignatieff,
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (2001); A. Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and
Women’s Rights (2001);W.Kymlicka andM.Opalski,Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory
and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe (2001); W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction
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